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THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIMENT IN THE CREATION
OF AN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
BEVERLY MAY CARL*
Ms. Carl analyzes the methods employed in Brazil to finance
the creation of a domestic aviation industry. In structuring its de-
velopment laws, Brazil adopted a unique approach of "mixed-
economy" corporations. By this blend of public and private
ownership coupled with foreign and domestic technology and a
system of tax incentives designed to assist in obtaining adequate
capitalization, Brazil hopes to overcome the economic and techni-
cal obstacles to the achievement of an industry competitive in the
world market. Should the venture prove successful, the Brazilian
pattern may serve as a model for other countries in their economic
development.
I. INTRODUCTION
W EN a country with an annual per capita gross national
product of US $357' decides to create its own airplane
industry, as has Brazil recently, outsiders are understandably sur-
prised. To foreign skeptics, however, Brazilians might respond with
the assertion that the first airplane was invented by their com-
patriot, Santos Dumont, rather than the Wright brothers. More-
over, an attempt to commercialize air transport was started in
Brazil as early as 1890 when Leopoldo Correia da Silva floated
stock at 100 milreis per share in the Brazilian Air Transport Com-
pany for the construction of dirgibles in Rio de Janeiro.' Although
the venture failed to get off the ground due to inadequate capital-
* B.S.L., J.D. University of Southern California; LL.M., Yale Law School.
Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Ms. Carl served in
Brazil from 1965 to 1967 as Chief, Investment Guarantees and Incentives Divi-
sion, American Embassy.
'U.S. Agency for Int'l Development, Presidential Mission to Brazil (1969).
2 Urn Boa Acao Nas Asas, Guia de Incentivos Fiscias, 79 VEJA 117 (1970?).
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ization, Brazilians have never relinquished their dream of a do-
mestic aviation industry.
With a population of ninety-six million people and a territory
larger than the continental United States, Brazil still lacks an ade-
quate railroad or highway system.' The main link to her interior
regions is the airplane and even cattle have been shipped by air."
An expanding need for air transport has resulted in Brazil's using
her limited foreign exchange resources not only to purchase large
commercial jets from the developed world, but also to spend US
$10 million yearly for small general aviation aircraft from Amer-
ican suppliers, such as Piper, Cessna and Beechcraft.' According
to a recent survey, the Brazilian market for small planes is growing
five per cent per year.'
All this does not mean Brazil has yet to construct an airplane.
Developmental efforts began in 1921 with the production of the
"Rio de Janeiro";' several decades ago the government created the
Central Aeronautics Center (CTA) which still has the only wind
tunnel in Latin America.! By 1969, Neiva, a private firm had
turned out 120 Regentes C-42, a metal monomotor aircraft, which
was the first Brazilian plane produced by assembly line methods."
SBrazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), March 3, 1971, at 11-B, col. 1.
4 In 1964 Brazil had approximately 1,200 registered airports, eighty of which
were maritime or river facilities. Many of the airports were only graded landing
strips, but thirty airports had paved airstrips and modern ground facilities. Air
traffic between Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro was reported as second only to that
between New York and Chicago. Air taxi service was available at almost every
airport and was especially popular in the interior where in some places it con-
stituted the sole means of transportation. See U.S. DEP'T OF Tm ARMY: Pub.
No. 550-20, UNITED STATES ARMY AREA HANDBOOK FOR BRAZIL 562 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as AREA HANDBOOK].
' Letter from James R. Cheek, Transportation Officer, American Embassy,
Rio de Janeiro, to J.A. Bede of Bede Aircraft Co., Dec. 29, 1970. American small
plane exports to Brazil amounted to US $11 million in 1968 and US $7.2 million
in 1970. U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A 284 Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
'0 Voo da EMBRAER, Guia de Incentivos Fiscais, 117 VEJA 78 (1971?).
According to this study, 44% of the demand is for four seater executive planes
and 15% for crafts with six to eight seats.
7 Id.
' The Portuguese term for the center is "Centro Tecnico de Aeronautica."
The CTA trained a pool of technical workers, many of whom have supplied other
Brazilian industries such as the automotive industry. Interview with James R.
Cheek, Transportation Officer, American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, June 3, 1971.
'The company now manufacturers the following additional aircraft: (1) a
two motor, eight-seater plane selling at NCr $1.5 million or about US $300,000
at the June 1971 exchange rate; (2) three kinds of a four-seater plane at prices
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Meanwhile, Aerotec, another private company, was also building
several small planes primarily for military usage.' Scores of other
enterprises manufactured aircraft parts, such as instruments, seat
belts and accessories;" sixty-five per cent of the components of
the Regente C-42 had been made in Brazil."
Nonetheless, these endeavors by private industry cannot be
viewed as flowing from the operation of free market forces since
the government, besides providing direct and indirect subsidies,
also purchased most of the production of these plants." No private
firm in Brazil possessed the capital resources required to inde-
pendently design a plane, construct a prototype, conduct the test
flights and develop a market. Likewise, Brazil lacked the sophis-
ticated technological tradition needed to produce a modem com-
mercial aircraft.' On the other hand, a substantial part of the
cost of building a conventional plane is labor, and manpower is
one resource Brazil has in excess (although admittedly skilled
workmen are still in short supply).
The year 1969 found Brazil enjoying an economic boom. The
gross national product had increased an estimated 8.4 per cent
and industrial production had jumped thirteen per cent the previous
year." During 1969 Brazil's automotive industry, which had started
only in the late 1950's, turned out over 350,000 vehicles. By that
same year, Brazil's new shipbuilding facilities had completed fifty-
eight vessels of more than 200 tons gross weight."6 Exhilarated by
this progress, the nation's leaders decided the time was ripe for a
major effort to create a Brazilian aviation industry.
ranging from NCr $130,000 to NCr $150,000; (3) the Regente ELO and Regente
420-B2, which are single-engine, two-seater planes sold primarily to the air force;
and (4) the Universal IPD-6201, a two seater trainer. 0 Voo da EMBRAER,
supra note 6; Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 5.
'o Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 5.
"Id.
"0 Voo de EMBRAER, supra note 6.
"Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 5.
14 TRANSPORTE MODERNO, Jan. 1968, at 75.
"FUNDACAO GETULIO VARGAS, cited in Trubec, Law, Planning and the De-
velopment of the Brazilian Capital Market: A Study of Law in Economic Change,
THE BULLETIN No. 72, 73 (N.Y.U.) 78 (1971).
'
6 BRAZILIAN NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF COMMERCE, A REPORT ON BRAZIL
9 (1971).
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II. CAPITALIZING THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
A. The Mixed-Economy Corporation
1. Historical antecedents. In structuring Brazil's development,
the dedication of some planners to the principle of free enterprise'
has been counterpoised against the conviction of others that basic
industries should be owned by the state.' At the same time, even
the most ardent defenders of the capitalistic system had to admit
domestic private resources were insufficient to finance the develop-
ment of many "essential" industries. Faced with these competing
philosophies, as well as the demands of reality, the country's
decision-makers evolved a peculiarly Brazilian compromise. The
bulk of industrial investments was left within the domain of private
business; a few projects, such as the Volta Redonda steel mill,'"
were reserved for corporations wholly owned by the government;
and finally, mixed-economy corporations were established to carry
out other activities in which the government had a special interest.
Funds to organize these mixed-economy corporations originate
with the government which takes a corresponding number of
equity shares in the company. Shares not held by the government
are offered at public sale to private investors. Important examples
of these mixed corporations include the Bank of Brazil, ELEC-
TROBRAS (electric power) and PETROBRAS (petroleum ex-
traction)." In 1965 the government authorized the release of up to
forty-nine per cent of the stock in mixed-economy companies for
17Brazil has oft proclaimed itself a "free-enterprise nation"; see, e.g., BRA-
ZILIAN EMBASSY (Washington, D.C.), A GUIDE To INVESTING IN BRAZIL 7 (1967).
The current Brazilian regime came to power in 1964; the opening paragraph of
its Program for Economic Action, stated, "Government action in democratic
political systems should be oriented to establish conditions which assure the most
efficient functioning of the free enterprise or price economy." Trubec, note 15, at
33, n.38.
"AREA HANDBOOK, note 4, at 488.
"This operation is owned by the Companhia Siderurgica Nacional. G. GAR-
LAND, DOING BUSINESS IN AND WITH BRAZIL 90 (1971).
11Id. The production of crude oil by PETROBRAS is the only activity in which
the federal government holds a monopoly. BRAZILIAN EMBASSY, supra, note 17, at
7. In the early 1960's, the Goulard administration had decided to nationalize
several small oil refineries, but in 1965 the government reversed this decision and,
except for crude oil production, opened up the petrochemical industry to private
enterprise. Decree No. 56,570 of July 9, 1965, [1965] 6 Colecao (exec.) 32,
D.O., July 12, 1965; Decree No. 56,571 of July 9, 1965, [1965] 6 Colecao (exec.)
33, D.O., July 12, 1965. See also, Carl, Incentives for Private Investment in
Brazil, 6 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 190, 202 (1967).
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sale to the public.21 Nevertheless, through a combination of mixed-
economy companies and 100 per cent government corporations,
approximately thirty-six per cent of Brazilian industry has come to
be owned by the government."
2. Creation of EMBRAER. With this historic trend toward
mixed-economy companies, it is not remarkable that Brazil would
turn to the same device when designing the legal foundation upon
which to build a domestic aviation industry. A mixed corporation,
EMBRAER ("Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica" or the Brazilian
Aeronautics Company), was created by Decree Law 770 of August
19, 1969 (D.L. 770),"2 and the President approved its charter
the following December.' That law called for an initial capital-
ization of NCr $50 million' with fifty-one per cent of the voting
stock to be held by the government and the remainder to be
offered private firms or individuals."
As of March 3, 1971, NCr $25.5 million had been raised on
the initial subscription; in addition to this equity contribution, the
company obtained another NCr $40 million from the National
Fund for Development of Strategic Areas." By 1976, EMBRAER's
officers hope to increase the company's capitalization to NCr $560
million.2
2 Law No. 4,728 of July 14, 1965, art. 60 [1965] 5 Colecao(legis) 51, D.O.,
July 16, 1965.
22 This was the estimate made by the "Parliamentary Commission"; See R.
MEDINA, DESNACIONALIZACAO: CRIME CONTRA BRASIL? 91 (1970). He adds that
a report by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry indicates that of one thousand
large companies studied, the controlling shares were held by the government for
40% of them. An earlier breakdown made in 1962 showed the state and federal
governments in Brazil as owning 47% of the iron and steel industry, 32% of
the plastics industry, 30% of the electric utilities industry and 10% of the chem-
ical industry. AREA HANDBOOK, supra, note 4, at 488.
'
3 Arts. 1 and 4, 33 Lex. 1201 (1969); and Decree No. 65,482 of October 21,
1969, D.O., § 1, pt. 1, Oct. 23, 1969.
1'Decree No. 66,005 of Dec. 30, 1969, 33 Lex 2,599 (1969).
' No effort will be made in this article to convert cruzeiros novos into dollars
since the exchange rates are not constant. However, to give the reader some feel
for the range of magnitudes involved, it can be stated that the exchange rate as
of June 1971 was NCr $5 to US $1. Thus, NCr $50 million would be equivalent
to US $10 million. In 1969, when EMBRAER started, this amount was closer to
the equivalent of US $12.5 million.
216 Decree Law 770 of Aug. 19, 1969, art. 4, 33 Lex 1201 (1969). Article 5
requires the government when EMBRAER's capital is increased, to acquire suffi-
cient additional stock to hold 51% of the voting shares.
2 7Brazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), Mar. 3, 1971, at 11-B, col. 1.
28 Id.
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B. Techniques to Market Private Shares
With majority control in the government, private purchasers of
EMBRAER would have no real voice in the company's operations.
Moreover, as a new firm in an untested field, EMBRAER was not
yet a profitable enterprise and might never become one. In a free
marketplace, such shares would hold little attraction for private
investors. The organizers of the company, however, were deter-
mined to make it a truly mixed-economy corporation with sub-
stantial private participation. Hence, they resorted to special
mechanisms the government had previously designed to enhance
the marketability of equity shares and to promote investment in
certain preferred economic sectors or regions.
1. Background of Investment Incentives. When the Castello
Banco government took power in Brazil in 1964, the securities
market was a relatively undeveloped institution. Although there
were twenty-one stock exchanges with listings on the exchange
obligatory for Brazilian corporations,29 only about five per cent of
the securities were actually traded. The combined volume of trans-
actions for all exchanges, a mere US $146 million in 1961,"° re-
flected the public's traditional preference for investments in real
estate or in high interest loans over equities. At the same time,
galloping inflation, which at one point in the early sixties reached
140 per cent on an annual basis, had devoured the cash reserves of
businesses, leaving them starved for medium and long term credit,
which was no longer available.
To attract private savings to equity investments, to improve the
liquidity of private companies and to create a vigorous securities
market, the Capital Market Law was enacted in 1965.91 This
statute contained provisions to prevent fraud and price rigging, to
regulate brokerage and investment companies, and to ensure public
access to essential information about stocks. 2
Along with these reforms came the concept of "democratization
2 9 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ESTABLISHING A BUSINESS IN BRAzIL 24 (O.B.R.
66-10, 1966).
'
0 AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 604.
s Law No. 4,728 of July 14, 1965, [19651 5 Colecao (legis.) 33, D.O., July 16,
1965.
22 Also, corporations for the first time were permitted to issue convertible de-
bentures. Id. at art. 2 and see, Carl, supra note 20, at 202-03.
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of capital," i.e., that closely-held corporations should be opened
to public participation and that ownership of equity shares should
be more widely disseminated among the Brazilian populace. Law
No. 4,506 of November 30, 1964" granted tax benefits to com-
panies which opened their shares to public sale' and offered tax
incentives to individuals and firms to encourage the purchase of
stock in these "open capital companies."'
In 1967 another mechanism was created which had a major
impact on the Brazilian capital markets. Decree Law 157 of
February 10, 1967 (D.L. 157)" permitted an individual taxpayer
to credit against his income tax amounts invested in authorized
financial institutions which then reinvested these D.L. 157 funds
in shares or debentures of private firms'7 approved by the Central
Bank of Brazil. Currently, the D.L. 157 credit is limited to twelve
per cent of the tax due.'
Of course, the effective operation of any tax incentive presup-
poses the existence of two basic conditions: (1) a broadly based
tax at rates sufficiently high to induce a sizable number of persons
to undertake the paperwork necessary to obtain the tax relief, and
(2) an administrative structure capable of collecting taxes and
enforcing penalties for evasion of revenue laws. Although con-
spicuously absent throughout much of Brazil's history, these pre-
137 Colecao (legis.) 364, D.O. (Supp.), Nov. 30, 1964.
34Open capital companies are relieved from paying certain taxes and allowed
to deduct dividends paid (up to a specified limit) as a cost for tax purposes. G.
GARLAND, DOING BUSINESS IN AND WITH BRAZIL 52 (1971).
31 Companies are allowed up to a I % credit against income tax and individuals
up to 3 % for amounts invested in these open capital corporations. Id. at 59, 60.
Open capital corporations are those that hold certificates issued by the Central
Bank of Brazil attesting their status as such. See, Central Bank Res. 106, as
amended, May 19, 1969.
"Art. 3 [1967] 1 Colecao (legis.) 177, D. 0., Feb. 13, 1967.
' Originally these funds were to be reinvested only in newly issued shares
or debentures of firms engaged in Central Bank-approved efforts to improve their
liquidity. Art. 7. However, Central Bank Res. 60 (1967) waived Article 7 and
now permits one-third of the D.L. 157 Funds to be used to buy existing shares
of companies registered under Article 7. Although Brazilian attorneys were sur-
prized that the government had used a "regulation" to amend the governing
"law," this practice is not an unusual one in this area. Trubec, supra note 15, at
60.
38 Id. at 57. To qualify for this tax credit the taxpayers must hold the Decree
Law 157 shares in the "authorized financial institution" four years although par-
tial redemption is allowed in year two and three. Decree Law No. 1,109 of
June 26, 1970; and see Trubec, supra note 15, at 57.
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requisites can today be considered satisfied as a result of massive
tax reforms instituted in 1964."
At first, the benefits available under D.L. 157 were not widely
understood and only 35,000 individual taxpayers took the credit
in 1968. By 1969 however, the number of individuals taking the
credit was up to 450,0000 and this increase should continue since,
from 1971 on, anyone receiving as much as NCr $5,000 must file
a tax return. "'
These various incentive programs led to a boom in the secondary
market and reversed a long period of depression in stock prices.
One leading indicator, the SN index, showed the real average
prices of shares rose 26.4 per cent in 1968 and 151 per cent in
1969. The index continued rising in 1970. Even more impressive
was the growth in volume of trading on the Rio de Janeiro Stock
Exchange which jumped from NCr $165 million in 1965 to NCr
$2,800 million (US $571 million) in 1970.'
In addition to those laws directed toward the development of
the securities market, the government passed a series of acts pro-
viding generous tax incentives for investments in particular regions
or designated economic sectors. For example, a private firm is
allowed to take a credit against its income tax for investment in
new projects in the Northeast or the Amazon or in the tourism,
fishing or forestry industries.' Credits for investments in such
favored enterprises can be combined so long as the total cumulative
credits do not exceed fifty per cent of the tax due."
"The basic rate on business income today is 30%; while the maximum rate
for individuals is 50%, even moderate amounts of income are taxed at rather
high rates. G. GARLAND, DOING BUSINESS IN AND WITH BRAZIL 129-130 (1971).
See also, Decree No. 58,400 of May 10, 1966; Decree Law No. 62 of Nov. 21,
1966; Brazilian Embassy, supra note 17, at 34ff; and G. GARLAND, A BUSINESS-
MAN'S INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW AND PRACTICE 92 (1966).
As the result of reforms in the tax collection system, the government tax re-
ceipts as a percentage of gross national product rose from 18% in 1963 to 26%
in 1969. Fundacao Getulio Vargas-IBRE as cited in Trubec, supra note 15, at 21.
The number of tax returns filed increased from 840,000 in 1960 to almost four
million in 1969 and the Director of Federal Revenue estimated a total of six
million returns for 1970. Correo da Manha (Rio de Janeiro), Nov. 20, 1970.
4
'Guia de Incentivos Fiscais, 79 VEJA 23 (1970?).
4' Correo da Manha (Rio de Janeiro), Nov. 20, 1970.
'"Trubec, supra note 15, at 71-72.
'See, Carl, supra note 20.
"See, e.g., Law No. 5,174 of Oct. 27, 1966, art. 17, [1966] 7 Colecao (legis.)
335, D.O., Oct. 31, 1966.
1972] BRAZIL: AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
2. EMBRAER Incentives. The techniques devised to make
EMBRAER's shares marketable were meshed with the existing
incentive system. Thus, for fiscal years 1970 to 1975, any firm"
operating in Brazil' can take a credit against its income tax for
amounts used to purchase EMBRAER stock so long as the total
credit for EMBRAER shares does not exceed one per cent of the
tax due." Moreover, the amounts represented by EMBRAER
stock are not included within the fifty per cent limit on combined
investment tax credit; rather they can be added on top of the other
investment credits to permit a maximum total credit of fifty-one
per cent."' In fact, EMBRAER has adopted as its slogan, "Surpass
the fifty per cent barrier on income tax credits."
From fiscal years 1971 to 1974, thirty per cent of the funds
credited by firms for investments to be made in other privileged
economic areas, such as the Northeast, are to be channeled, instead,
to the Program for National Integration." This means, for example,
a taxpayer who takes the fifty per cent credit allowed for invest-
ments in the Northeast will lose thirty per cent of that fifty per cent
credit to the public treasury" for the years 1971-1974. He will
45 This credit is available to "pessoas juridicas" i.e., juridical persons. Through-
out this article this Portuguese term will be translated as "firms," since the phrase
includes a wide variety of legal associations. The most common form is the "so-
ciedade anonima," similar to the American corporation. Decree Law No. 2,627
of Sept. 26, 1940, [1940] 5 Colecao (exec.) 353, D.O., Sept. 27, 1940; Law No.
4,728 of July 14, 1965, [1965] 5 Colecao (legis.) 33, D.O., July 16, 1965. Another
popular form is the "limitada" whose characteristics are set forth in Decree Law
No. 3,708 of Jan. 10, 1919, [1919] 1 Colecao (legis.) 155. See Brazilian Em-
bassy, supra note 17, at 27-30 for a description of other type of business entities.
These include, for example, a "sociedade em nome colectivo" (C. Com. arts.
315-316), a "sociedade em comandita" (C. Com. arts. 311-14), a "sociedade de
capital e industria" (C. Com. arts. 371-24), and a "sociedad6 em conta de par-
ticipacao" or joint venture (C. Com. arts. 325-28).
41 Originally only firms whose capital was 100% Brazilian-owned were eligible
to take the tax credit for investments in the Northeast Region, the first major tax
inventive program. In 1963, however, the law was amended to allow any firm
operating in Brazil, including foreign companies, to take the credit and this pat-
tern has continued to be followed in subsequent investment inventive legislation.
See, e.g., Law No. 3,995 of Dec. 14, 1961, art. 34, [1961] 7 Colecao (legis.) 25,
32, D.O. Dec. 21, 1961, as amended by Law No. 4,239 of June 27, 1963, art. 18,
[1963] 5 Colecao (legis.) 49, 55, D.O., July 12, 1963.
4 7 Decree Law 770 of Aug. 19, 1969, art. 7, 33 Lex 1201 (1969).
48 Id. at art. 7, sec. 1.
4' Brazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), Mar. 3, 1971, at 11-B, col. 1.
"*Decree Law 1, 106 of June 16, 1970, art. 5, sec. 2, 34 Lex 497 (1970).
51 A word of explanation seems due here on how the tax mechanism operates
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receive no shares in return for this thirty per cent leaving an
effective credit of only thirty-five per cent (30% x 50% subtracted
from 50% equals 35%). However, EMBRAER has been exempt-
ed from the provisions of this new restriction and private firms
can still obtain the full benefit of the one per cent credit for
EMBRAER stock purchases."
Since it cost companies nothing to buy these shares (at least to
the extent of the one per cent credit), over 500 firms purchased
EMBRAER stock in 1970." Local businesses hoping to supply
parts and accessories to EMBRAER have shown a special interest
in taking advantage of the credit."
Article 8 of Decree Law 770 attempts to offer an incentive also
to the individual taxpayer by permitting him to use the resources,
which would otherwise be channeled to financial institutions under
D.L. 157, to purchase initial EMBRAER shares and take the cor-
responding tax credit." However, to date the D.L. 157 "mutual
fund-type" investments have proved extremely profitable; in 1968
and 1969, the profits in no case ran less than forty per cent an-
nually." Thus, there would seem to be little immediate inducement
for the individual taxpayer to divert all or part of his D.L. 157
resources to EMBRAER stock which cannot be expected to show
a profit for some years. Still the mechanism does exist and may
have some appeal to the individual optimistic about the industry's
long range prospects.
C. Effects of These Techniques for Capital Formation
The individual and corporate incentives have succeeded in at-
tracting a substantial amount of capital to EMBRAER. By August
for incentives to invest in projects in fishing, forestry, or tourism or in the North-
east or Amazon region. In these cases (but not under the D.L. 157 device), the
taxpayer does not actually retain the funds for which he is taking the investment
credit. Rather such funds are paid in and placed on deposit with the appropriate
government agency in the taxpayer's name for subsequent release to the company
operating the new approved project. The original taxpayer has already paid in
the actual funds represented by the credit and the government, to make this new
law function, simply has to transfer 30% of the deposited monies over the Pro-
gram for National Integration.
"1 Decree Law 1,106 of June 16, 1970, art. 5, sec. 3, 34 Lex 497 (1970).
13 Brazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), Mar. 3, 1971, at 1 I-B, col. 1.
Interview with James R. Cheek, supra note 8.
"August 19, 1969, 33 Lex 1201.
"Guia de Incentivos Fiscais, 79 VEJA 23 (1970?).
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of 1970 over NCr $6 million had been credited against taxes for
EMBRAER shares" and the Minister of the Treasury, Delfin Neto,
forecast NCr $20 million in credits for 1971 ." EMBRAER claimed
a total of 2,432 shareholders in January, 1971."
It can be noted that in granting these tax credits the government
gave up an equivalent amount in revenue. Alternatively it could
have kept the tax monies and used them to acquire 100 per cent
of the company's stock. Should the enterprise become profitable
someday, then all the dividends would have accrued to the public
treasury, while under this scheme up to forty-nine per cent of any
future profits will end up in private hands.
However, in addition to capitalizing an aircraft industry, gov-
ernment planners were endeavoring to promote several other de-
velopmental objectives. By structuring the corporation in this man-
ner the regime displayed an ideological commitment to private
capitalism'-even in the case of high risk venture like this where
a substantial financial and administrative input from the govern-
ment would be indispensable to starting up the industry.
The use of the tax mechanism to elicit equity investments from
the private sector can also be viewed as another effort to help
strengthen the securities market by increasing the total number of
issues available for public sale. This approach further contributes
to the goal of "democratization of capital" by spreading the
ownership of EMBRAER among several thousand shareholders.
Finally, by compelling taxpayers either to save in the form of these
investments or to lose the corresponding amounts in the form of
taxes, devices such as D.L. 157 and the EMBRAER incentives are
intended to educate the public. After a period of such "forced
savings,"" it is hoped that the public will have learned the value of
11 Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), Dec. 13, 1970.
53 Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), June 29, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
59 EMBRAER, 2 NOTICIAS no. 6 (Jan.-Feb. 1971).
60 The loyalty of the Brazilian planners to the private sector is indicated not
only by the capitalization techniques used, but also by article 2, section 1 of the
EMBRAER statute which directs that Corporation "to the extent possible, to
carry out its projects indirectly through contracts with private industry." Decree
Law 770, 33 Lex. 1201 (1969). Private business also benefits from EMBRAER
through the multiplier effect; for example, over forty private Brazilian companies
furnished raw materials and parts for the Bandeirante. (0 Voo da EMBRAER,
supra note 6.)
"Trubec, supra note 15, at 66.
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holding equities and will be disposed to invest their own resources
in other Brazilian stocks.
On the other hand, not all authorities are enthusiastic about the
use of tax incentives as a development tool. Obviously, channeling
the nation's limited resources into investments like EMBRAER or
tourist hotels means diversion of funds the government might other-
wise have collected and used for sorely needed social welfare
projects, such as education, low cost housing or medical care.
Since Brazil has a graduated tax structure, the tax incentive route
means the benefits to wealthy taxpayers are disproportionately
higher than those for taxpayers in the middle and lower income
brackets. This effect is compounded by the lack of a capital gains
tax. Should EMBRAER become a profitable operation, the original
taxpayer will receive the benefit of the money represented by his
original tax credit plus capital appreciation free of any tax liability. "
III. PRODUCTION OF EMBRAER
By 1970 EMBRAER had completed a sizeable factory at Sao
Jose do Campos near the city of Sao Paulo 3 and had acquired a
basic staff of 550 people. An additional 5,000 jobs are estimated
to have been created indirectly by EMBRAER's activities." The
Company currently has four kinds of planes in the production
process.
The Ipanema is a single engine, one-seater agricultural plane
designed for crop dusting, seeding and fertilizing.' EMBRAER
has contracted for this plane to be built by the private firm,
Aerotec." The first prototype was flown in June, 1970," and large
scale production is planned."8
62 Id. at 68; and see TILBERY, BASE ECONOMICA E EFEITO DAS ISENCOES,
INCENTIVOS FISCAIS PARA 0 DESENVOLVIMENTO 41-48 (1971?). Some of the above
mentioned effects will be limited by the new Program for National Integration
which will rechannel part of these funds back into the public sector, though not,
of course, in the case of EMBRAER.
62 Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 5.
"0 Voo da EMBRAER, supra note 6.
63 This plane offers a cockpit with 360 degrees visibility, has a maximum
speed of 340 kilometers and a maximum load of 550 kilos. See 0 Voo da
EMBRAER, supra note 6, and 94 Aviation Week 62 (1971) (Jan. 11).
'Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 5.
67 0 Voo da EMBRAER, supra note 6.
8 Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 5.
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The Urupema, a sports glider, is now in production: ten are
destined for the military and ten for commercial use."' The Xavante,
known outside Brazil as the Aeromacchi EMB-326-GB, is a small
jet trainer-fighter manufactured under a US $53 million licensing
and purchasing agreement signed in 1970 with Macchi, an Italian
firm." The schedule calls for 112 Xavantes to be completed by
November, 1976.1
The Bandeirante, a nine to twelve seat turbo-prop of Brazilian
design," is a short take off and landing craft with maximum flying
time of four hours and forty-five minutes. " The Bandierante's first
test flight was successfully made in October, 1968. Four proto-
types have been finished and plans call for the production of
eighty Bandierantes within the next few years."1
IV. IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY
The Brazilian authorities recognized it would be technically and
economically unfeasible to attempt to build an aircraft from
scratch. Hence, in addition to acquiring the licensing rights for the
Xavante, the Brazilians in their contract with Macchi also secured
a commitment to furnish technical assistance over a ten year period
for the production of the Bandeirante and other types of equip-
ment." Likewise, Cessna, an American company, helped in the
09 94 AVIATION WEEK 62 (Jan. 11, 1971).
M0 U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
Macchi is 20% owned by Lockheed. Bus. WEEK, March 14, 1970, at 46.
" U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
12 Brazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), March 3, 1971, at 11-B, col. 1.
,' Its maximum speed is 560 kilometers per hour. 0 Voo da EMBRAER,
supra note 6. The take off and landing distance is 2,000 feet over a fifty foot
barrier. 94 AVIATION WEEK 62 (Jan. 11, 1971).
'4 Since then the plane has clocked over 1,000 trouble free flight hours. 0 Voo
de EMBRAER, supra note 6.
78 Letter from James R. Creek, supra note 5. Affectionately denominated by
Brazilians as the "grasshopper" because of its unlovely appearance, the Ban-
deirante will come in eight models; (1) an executive transport for seven to eight
passengers plus baggage; (2) a parachuter's transport for seven to twelve men;
(3) a cargo transport for up to one metric ton; (4) a medical transport for four
stretcher patients, two seated patients and one doctor; (5) an instruction craft;
(6) an aerophotographic model; (7) a surveillance or anti-guerrilla plane; and
(8) a search and rescue craft. See, EMBRAER, I NOTICIAS, No. 4 (July, 1970)
and 0 Voo da EMBRAER, supra note 6. The Air Force will be the initial client
for this plane. Bus. WEEK, March 14, 1970, at 46.
70 U.S. Dept. State Airgrams A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
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technology for the Ipanema."
Since practical considerations demanded that, besides know-how,
certain parts and materials be imported during the initial phase of
development, D.L. 770 granted EMBRAER a total exemption
from all taxes and customs duties on its imports of raw materials,
parts, components, equipment and other machinery,"8 so long as no
"similar" product is made in Brazil." Motors, parts and equipment
destined for the "maintenance, repair, or conversion of aircraft"
had already been exempted from import duties under a previous
decree."
The first few Xavante jets will be assembled in Brazil with
components imported from Italy." Although the Bandeirante pri-
marily uses Brazilian-made parts, it will carry a Pratt & Whitney
engine, 2 American electronic equipment and French landing
gear.' The Ipanema is powered with a Lycoming engine driving
a McCauley propeller.'" EMBRAER plans progressively to manu-
facture more parts locally, except where domestic production
would "result in costs uncompetitive in the world market."'"
V. DEVELOPMENT OF MARKETS
Despite the vast amount of land devoted to farming, Brazil had
only thirty agricultural planes in 1970," compared to 5,000 in the
17 Interview with James R. Cheek, supra note 8.
71August 19, 1969, art. 15, 33 Lex 1201.
7' Decree Law No. 37 of Nov. 18, 1966 [1966] 7 Colecao (legis.) 56, D.O.,
Nov. 21, 1966. Article 18 of that Decree Law established three basic criteria
that the Customs Policy Council must consider in determining whether a Bra-
zilian product shall be treated as a "similar": (a) price not above the cruzeiro
cost of importing a similar foreign product, calculated on the basis of "normal
price" plus all taxes and fees incident to importation; (b) normal delivery time
currently in effect for similar merchandise; and (c) equivalent quality and ade-
quote specifiications. On the other hand, the following items are considered
"similars" without a specific declaration of "similarity": natural products or goods
with primary processing, raw materials and consumer goods commonly known
to be produced in Brazil. Id., art. 20, at 60. See also Decree Law 61,574 of
Oct. 20, 1967 and U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS OF
BRAZIL 1 (O.B.R. 69-53, 1966).
"ODecree No. 64,004 of Jan. 31, 1969, 33 Lex 90 (1969).
1 U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
82 Id.
3Bus. WEEK, March 14, 1970, at 46.
"194 AVIATION WEEK 62 (1971) (Jan. 11).
" 0 Voo da EMBRAER, supra note 6.
8I Id.
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United States, 500 in Mexico and 175 in tiny El Salvador." Several
years ago when disease struck the rice plantations in the Brazilian
state of Rio Grande do Sul, one-half of the crop was lost because
only fifteen of the nation's crop dusters were in operating condi-
tion." Such examples have led economists to predict a market for
1,000 Ipanem a's over the next five years."'
In order to stimulate a demand by accustoming Brazilians to
using these machines, a recent law has exempted "imported" agri-
cultural aircraft from all customs duties."0 At the same time, the
Ministry of Agriculture has fostered the organization of eleven
companies which buy agricultural aircraft and sell their services
to individual farmers unable to afford a plane." Finally, the Bank
of Brazil is exploring a possible loan program to ease purchases
of the Ipanema by land owners and co-ops."
Once the demand has been created and the national industry is
well underway, it seems likely new import restrictions will be
imposed to protect EMBRAER's products. With this potential
threat to the small plane export business of the United States, the
American Embassy has advised American firms to keep a close
eye on these developments. Representatives of Piper and Cessna
have already visited Brazil for this purpose."
EMBRAER expects to produce between 100 and 150 Bandeir-
antes annually.' The Rio newspaper, the Brazil Herald, claims that
more than 200 Brazilian cities have lost air service within the last
ten years because the world has no suitable machine to economical-
ly transport small numbers of travelers into the nation's interior.
The less sophisticated Bandeirante is expected to fill this gap by
offering a craft attractive to airlines for hundreds of currently
marginalized cities.'
Ultimately however, EMBRAER hopes an international market
8 7 U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
8 0 Voo da EMBRAER, supra note 6.
: Bus. WEEK, March 14, 1970, at 46.
9
°Law No. 5,618 of Nov. 3, 1970, 34 Lex 1039 (1970).
Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), June 29, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
° 0 Voo da EMBRAER, supra note 6.
"3U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A. 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
"
4 Brazil Herald, March 3, 1971, at 11-B, col. 1.
95 Id.
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can be developed for this plane. Portugal, New Zealand, Mozam-
bique, Angola, Canada and France reportedly have inquired about
the craft." Colonel Osires Silva, Director of EMBRAER, has ex-
pressed his faith in the existance of such market:
More than 100 countries from the so-called Third World need
airplanes appropriate to their commercial short and medium
traffic density. The large aeronautical companies, i.e., the airplane
industry, do not produce machines of this type. In addition, there
is a need for a tough aircraft suitable for bad fields in the Third
World countries. This is a Bandeirante market .... 9
Although other experts have disagreed on whether a similar
plane is already available elsewhere and opinions conflict whether
the Bandeirante can be produced at a price competitive on the
world market," Piper is reported to be exploring the possibility of
an overseas marketing agreement with EMBRAER." Colonel
Silva has expressed willingness to conclude an international market-
ing and servicing contract with a foreign firm, because "we shall




It remains to be seen if Brazil can overcome the technical ob-
stacles inherent in developing an aircraft industry. While prospects
for the venture's success have been labeled "rather dim,"'. 9. the
Brazilians remain firm in their determination to make the effort.
An American transportation expert living in Rio has noted:
The Brazilians have done it before when everybody said they
couldn't .... They built up the largest auto production in South
11 Id. and Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), April 6, 1970.
' Brazil Herald, March 3, 1971, at II-B, col. 3.
" The Brazil Herald, Id., claims that this plane will cost US $450,000 but
Business Week asserts it will sell for US $1 million or twice the price of a similar
plane on the free market. Bus. WEEK, March 14, 1970, at 46.
"Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), April 6, 1970. If EMBRAER's aircraft
are to be saleable outside Brazil, practical considerations necessitate that they
secure a United States Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of Air Worth-
iness, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1970), and
EMBRAER, intends to seek such certification. 94 AVIATION WEEK 62 (1971)
(Jan. 11).
'o9 Jornal do Brasil, June 29, 1970, at 24, col. 4.
101 U.S. Dep't State Airgram No. A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
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America from nothing a decade ago and the same with ship-
building. Any economist can come down here and say building
a turboprop is silly, but that's Brazil's way of generating tech-
nology. Instead of starting on square five with American-made
equipment, they are going back to square one to learn to make
their own."0
In time, Brazil may either have to erect a tariff wall to protect
this infant industry or subsidize the operation and sell below cost
to achieve a price competitive on the world market. Still with the
comparatively low cost of labor, perhaps the nation can confound
the skeptics by producing airplanes at a reasonable price.
The Brazilian model will no doubt we watched carefully by
other nations nearing the economic "take-off" point. Should this
experiment succeed, other countries may, in structuring their own
development laws, look to the Brazilian pattern with its unique
interweaving of public and private interests, foreign and home-
grown technology, as well as imported and domestic component
parts.
'" Bus. WEEK, March 14, 1970 at 47.
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